A report for the APEC Telecommunications
Working Group
Effective interconnection in the APEC region
1.1 Liberalisation of trade ? the goal of APEC
3.1 Telecommunications development
Figure 3.1 Levels of competition in APEC economies as at 1997
APEC Member Economy | Competition in Domestic Fixed Network Services | Competition in Mobile Services |
Australia | Yes | Yes |
Brunei Darussalem | No | No |
Canada | Yes | Yes |
Chile | Yes | Yes |
People's Republic of China | No | Yes |
Hong Kong, China | Yes | Yes |
Indonesia | No | Yes |
Japan | Yes | Yes |
Korea | Yes | Yes |
Malaysia | Yes | Yes |
Mexico | Yes | Yes |
New Zealand | Yes | Yes |
Papua and New Guinea | Not available | Not available |
Philippines | Yes | Yes |
Singapore | No | Yes |
Chinese Taipei | No | Yes |
Thailand | No | Yes |
USA | Yes | Yes |
Figure 3.2 Key statistics APEC economies Key statistics APEC economies
Country | Population (m) |
Area ('000 sq km) |
Pop'n density (per sq km) |
GDP ($ per head) |
Telephone lines (m) |
Telephone penetration |
Mobile phones (m) |
Mobile penetration |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Australia | 18.063 | 7740 | 2.3 | 19820 | 9.45 | Note 2 52.3% |
4.1 | Note 2 22.7% |
Brunei | 0.29 | 5.27 | 55.0 | 14307 | 0.07 | 24.1% | 0.04 | 13.8% |
Canada | 29.55 | 9970.6 | 3.0 | 18983 | 17.7 | 59.9% | 3.37 | 11.4% |
Chile | 14.23 | 748.8 | 19.0 | 4133 | 1.88 | 13.2% | 0.3 | 2.1% |
China | 1200 | 9326 | 129 | 561 | 40.7 | 3.4% | 3.63 | 0.3% |
Hong Kong, China | 6.19 | 1.076 | 5753 | 25614 | 3.5 | 56.5% | 1.25 | 20.2% |
Indonesia | 193 | 1812 | 107 | 882 | 3.3 | 1.7% | 0.22 | 0.1% |
Japan | 125 | 377.8 | 331 | 36075 | 61 | 48.8% | 23 | 18.4% |
Korea | 44.85 | 98.73 | 454 | 11450 | 18.6 | 41.5% | 3.14 | 7.0% |
Malaysia | 20.14 | 328.55 | 61.3 | 4202 | 3.34 | 16.6% | 1.65 | 8.2% |
Mexico | 91.83 | 1960 | 46.9 | 6509 | 8.8 | 9.6% | 0.64 | 0.7% |
New Zealand | 3.6 | 263 | 13.7 | 15439 | 1.66 | 46.1% | 0.47 | 13.1% |
Papua New Guinea | 4.3 | 453 | 9.5 | 1275 | 0.04 | 0.9% | 0 | 0.0% |
Philippines | 68.6 | 298.17 | 230 | 1090 | 1.43 | 2.1% | 0.5 | 0.7% |
Singapore | 3.74 | 0.648 | 5772 | 27528 | 1.56 | 41.7% | 0.39 | 10.4% |
Chinese Taipei | 21 | 35.98 | 584 | 12288 | 8.77 | 41.8% | 1.1 | 5.2% |
Thailand | 58.2 | 511 | 114 | 2749 | 3.5 | 6.0% | 1.08 | 1.9% |
USA | 263 | 9809.43 | 26.8 | 27129 | 165 | 62.7% | 44 | 16.7% |
3.3 The regulatory framework for interconnection
Figure 3.3 APEC member economy interconnection arrangements
APEC Member Economy | Regulatory agency independent of market operators | Separation of policy and regulatory roles | Interconnection Guidelines or Legislation | Competitive Safeguards |
Australia | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Brunei Darussalem | No | No | Not available | Not available |
Canada | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Chile | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
People's Republic of China | No | No | No | Not available |
Hong Kong, China | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Indonesia | Yes | No | Yes | Not available |
Japan | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
Korea | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
Malaysia | Yes | Yes | Yes | Developing |
Mexico | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
New Zealand | Yes ? not telecom specific. | Not applicable | Yes ? not telecom specific | Yes |
Papua and New Guinea | Not available | Not available | Not available | Not available |
Philippines | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Singapore | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Chinese Taipei | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Thailand | Yes | No | No | Not available |
USA | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
3.4 Commercial arrangements for interconnection
Figure 3.4 Arrangements for establishing interconnection charges
APEC Member Economy | Commercial Negotiation of Interconnect Charges | Role of regulator | Charging Basis |
Australia | Yes, preferred | Accept access undertakings and may intervene if negotiations fail | Cost-based (Total Service Long Run Incremental Cost) |
Brunei Darussalem | Not applicable | Not applicable | Not applicable |
Canada | No | Regulated through Carrier Access Tariffs | Cost-based |
Chile | Yes, preferred | May intervene | Cost-based (Long Run Incremental Cost) |
People's Republic of China | Not available | Not available | Not available |
Hong Kong, China | Yes, preferred | May intervene | Cost-based |
Indonesia | Yes, on occasion | Determines charges | Revenue sharing |
Japan | Preferred in past, moving to a tariffed approach for dominant carriers in the future. | Tariff approval | Cost-based |
Korea | No | Determines charges | Cost-based |
Malaysia | Negotiated revenue sharing | None, at present | Revenue sharing |
Mexico | Yes, preferred | May intervene | Cost-based (Long Run Incremental Cost) |
New Zealand | Yes, preferred | No telecom specific regulator. Parties have recourse through the courts. | As negotiated |
Papua and New Guinea | Not available | Not available | Not available |
Philippines | Yes | Supervisory | Negotiated, revenue sharing ? cost-based planned |
Singapore | Yes, preferred | May intervene | Cost-based |
Chinese Taipei | Yes, preferred | May intervene as last resort | Cost-based (moving to Long Run Incremental Cost) |
Thailand | Revenue sharing | Not Applicable | As negotiated |
USA | Yes, preferred | May intervene if negotiations fail. | Cost-based (Long Run Incremental Cost) |
3.5 Key interconnect issues in APEC member economies
Transparency of interconnection arrangements
Interconnection and market structure
Unbundling of service elements and local service competition
Many APEC economies agree that one of their priorities is to improve service for users, the majority of whom are affected most by the availability and price of local service. Unbundling service elements is an approach to maximise competition in local service and, thereby, bring the benefits of competition ? better and cheaper service ? to the majority of telecommunications users. Unbundling of services can also benefit the incumbent carrier by increasing utilisation of the existing network. For example, in the U.S. and Japan, where local service competition has become a priority after many years of competition in other service areas, unbundling local service elements has been adopted as the preferred approach.
If an economy adopts an unbundled service elements approach, the issues for pricing these elements are similar to those already discussed in relation to the basis for establishing interconnection charges. To briefly recapitulate:
Resale and market structure
Resale can be used to encourage competition in terms of price and customer service. Resale allows for earlier entry and operation in the market, and can avoid uneconomic investment. New entrants who start as resellers can build a customer base which may grow to enable them to generate the scale necessary to support investments in their own facilities at a later date. In the U.S., for example, the second largest facilities-based carrier, MCI, began as a reseller competing against AT&T.
Significant issues in establishing a framework for resale include:
Fixed/mobile convergence
Universal service obligations and access deficits
4 APEC member economy profiles
4.1.1Key statistics
(19Y | Population | 18,063,000 |
(19Y | Area | 7.74 million sq km |
(19Y | Population density | 2.3 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $19,820 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 9.45 million (52.3%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 4.1 million (22.7%) |
4.1.2 Market structure
Fixed networks
Mobile market
4.1.3 Regulatory framework
Competitive safeguards
Tariff filing
Equal access
4.1.4 Interconnect arrangements
Outline of interconnect regulation
Policy objective
(19Y | 0.29 million | |
Population | ||
(19Y | Area | 5270 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 55 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $14,307 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 70,000 (24.1%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration | 37,000 (12.8%) |
(19Y | 29.55 million | Population |
(19Y | Area | 9,970,610 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 3.0 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $18,983 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 17.7 million (59.9%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 3.37 million (11.4%) |
Policy objectives
Competitive safeguards
Figure 4.3.1 Implications of split rate base
Competitive services | Utility services | |
Type of services | Long distance data and broadband services | Telephony services |
Earnings regulation | No |
Rate of return regulation until January 1998 Price caps from 1998 |
CRTC interest in profitability of telco | No | Not after 1998 |
Carriage of investment risks | Shareholders | Customers (for services where sufficient competition has not emerged) |
Investment in broadband capacity | In general, broadband capacity is allocated to this segment and transfer priced if required by utility segment | Can only be included if there is a demonstrated requirement for the bandwidth |
Role of the regulator
(19Y | Population | 14.23 million |
(19Y | Area | 748,800 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 19.0 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $4133 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 1.88 million (13.2%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 0.3 million (2.1%) |
Fixed network
Commercial principles
(19Y | Population | 1,200 million |
(19Y | Area | 9,326,000 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 129 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $561 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 40.7 million (3.4%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 3.6 million (0.3%) |
Policy objectives
(19Y | Population | 6.19 million |
(19Y | Area | 1076 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 5753 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | US $25,614 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 3.5 million (56.5%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 1.25 million (20.2%) |
Fixed networks
Outline of interconnect regulation
(19Y | Population | 193 million |
(19Y | Area | 1,812,000 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 107 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $882 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 3.3 million (1.7 %) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 0.22 million (0.1%) |
(19Y | retail price control |
(19Y | determination of interconnect agreements |
(19Y | development of technical standards |
(19Y | equipment approvals |
(19Y | spectrum allocation. |
Role of the regulator
(19Y | Population | 125 million |
(19Y | Area | 377,829 square km |
(19Y | Population Density | 331 per square km |
(19Y | GDP | US $36,075 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 61 million (48.8%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 23 million (18.4%) |
Past framework
(19Y | Population | 44.85 million |
(19Y | Area | 98,730 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 454 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $11,450 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 18.6 million (41.5%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 3.14 million (7%) |
Commercial arrangements
(19Y | Population | 20.14 million |
(19Y | Area | 328,550 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 61.3 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $4202 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 3.34 million (16.6%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 1.65 million (8.2%) |
Policy objectives
(19Y | Population | 91.83 million |
(19Y | Area | 1,960,000 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 46.9 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | US $6509 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 8.8 million (9.6%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 0.64 million (0.7%) |
Fixed networks
Principles for determining interconnect charges
(19Y | Population | 3.6 million |
(19Y | Area | 263,000 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 13.7 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $15,439 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 1.66 million (46.1%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 0.47 million (13.1%) |
Fixed networks
(19Y | Population | 4.3 million |
(19Y | Area | 453,000 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 9.5 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $1275 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 41,000 ().9%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | none |
(19Y | Population | 68.6 million |
(19Y | Area | 298,170 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 230 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $1090 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 1.43 million (2.1%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 0.5 million (0.7%) |
Policy objectives
(19Y | Population | 3.74 million |
(19Y | Area | 648 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 5772 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | US $27,528 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 1.56 million (41.7%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 0.39 million (10.4%) |
Principles
(19Y | Population | 21 million |
(19Y | Area | 35,980 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 584 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | $12,288 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 8.77 million (41.8%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 1.1 million (5.2%) |
Regulatory arrangements
(19Y | Population | 58.2 million |
(19Y | Area | 514,000 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 114 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | US $2749 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 3.5 million (6%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 1.08 million (1.9%) |
Fixed networks
Figure 4.17.1: BTO revenue-sharing agreements
Carrier |
Revenue sharing |
|
To: |
Amount: |
|
Telecom Asia |
TOT |
21% |
TT&T |
TOT |
44.5% |
AIS |
TOT |
20% |
TAC* |
CAT |
25% |
(19Y | Population | 263 million |
(19Y | Area | 9,809,430 sq km |
(19Y | Population Density | 26.8 per sq km |
(19Y | GDP | US $27,129 per capita |
(19Y | Fixed line penetration | 165 million (62.7%) |
(19Y | Mobile penetration (1 January 1997) | 44 million (16.7%) |
Regulations implementing the Telecom Act of 1996
Policy objective